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WHEN WILL THE LAW CATCH UP
WITH TECHNOLOGY? JAYCEE B. v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE
COUNTY: AN URGENT CRY FOR
LEGISLATION ON GESTATIONAL
SURROGACY
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the use of assisted reproductive methods,' only two
options were available to an infertile couple:2 they could remain
Assisted reproductive methods include surgical procedures such as in vitro
fertilization (IVF) and gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT). See UNITED STATES
CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND
SOCIAL CHOICES 122-25 (1988) [hereinafter OTA REPORT] (discussing available sur-
gical treatments for infertility); see generally JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF
CHOICE 97-145 (1994) (describing methods for treating infertility and collaborative
reproduction); TECHNOLOGY AND INFERTILITY: CLINICAL, PSYCHOSOCIAL, LEGAL,
AND ETHICAL ASPECTS 39-89 (Machelle M. Seibel et al. eds., 1993) (discussing vari-
ous surgical procedures used to treat infertility). Artificial insemination and surro-
gate motherhood are reproductive methods that do not necessarily need medical
procedures or technology, although they are commonly classified as "reproductive
technologies." See OTA REPORT, supra, at 267 (characterizing surrogate motherhood
as "more a reproductive arrangement than a reproductive technology. It may re-
quire neither physician nor complicated equipment."); JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING
THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 63 (1997)
(stating that "surrogacy is not really an instance of reproductive technology al-
though it is almost always considered and discussed as if it were"); JOHN YEH &
MOLLY ULINE YEH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INFERTILITY 125 (1991) (asserting that sur-
rogacy does not usually involve the use of technology).
2 Infertility is defined as "the inability of a couple to conceive after 12 months of
intercourse without contraception." OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. See YEH &YEH,
supra note 1, at 1 (stating that the above definition is the most commonly accepted).
While generally it is either the man or the woman who is infertile, infertility is usu-
ally characterized as afflicting the couple. See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 4
("Fertility is the product of interaction between two people and so the infertile pa-
tient is in effect the infertile couple.") (emphasis in original); Machelle M. Seibel,
Medical Evaluation and Treatment of the Infertile Couple, in TECHNOLOGY AND
INFERTILITY: CLINICAL, PSYCHOSOCIAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ASPECTS 11-12 (1993)
(asserting that infertility is different from all other medical conditions in that one
diagnosis affects two people).
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childless or they could seek to adopt.3 Technological advances in
medical and genetic procedures have made available different
familial relationships and compositions that were once thought
impossible.! Surrogacy5 is one alternative to traditional repro-
" A couple seeking to adopt a child is not guaranteed success. See NOEL P.
KEANE & DENNIS L. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 13 (1981) (positing that fewer
babies are available for adoption due to the alternatives of abortion and the pill);
YEH &YEH, supra note 1, at 139 (stating that there are fewer children to adopt due
to the larger number of unmarried pregnant women keeping their babies, the legali-
zation of abortion, and the use of contraceptives); Barbara Eck Manning, Historical
Perspective of the Infertile Experience, in TECHNOLOGY AND INFERTILITY: CLINICAL,
PSYCHOSOCIAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ASPECTS 271-72 (1993) ("Today 90 to 95% of
all single mothers and women pregnant out of wedlock keep their babies .... There-
fore [ I couples [are] less able to turn to adoption as an easy alternative .... ).
See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 3, 5 (suggesting that the "reproductive revo-
lution" is "changing the reproductive landscape and challenging basic notions about
procreation, parenthood, family, and children"); Christine Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last
Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a Commodification of Women's Bodies and
Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 114 (1997) (noting that "[tjhe growing preva-
lence of alternative reproductive technologies ... challenges contemporary society's
traditional notion of the nuclear family .. ."). For example, cryopreservation, the
freezing of sperm, eggs, or embryos has made it possible for a child to be born from
the gametes of a dead person. See, e.g., DOLGIN, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that to-
day an embryo "may be frozen and stored for months, or even years, and then
thawed for implantation and gestation .... [Rabies may be born years after the
deaths of their genetic 'parents' "); George J. Annas, Fertility Clinics Hardly Letter-
Perfect, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1997, at D1, available in 1997 WL 6283271 (listing
"the collection and use of sperm from corpses" as one of the reproductive technolo-
gies currently being used); Judy Peres, A Mother Beyond the Grave? Parents Have
Ova of Dead Daughter Planted in Surrogate, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at Al,
available in 1997 WL 16507193 (describing the ethical, social, and legal questions
raised by posthumous reproduction).
5 The surrogacy relationship is defined by an "[aigreement wherein a woman
agrees to be artificially inseminated with the semen of another woman's husband;
she is to conceive a child, carry the child to term and after the birth, assign her pa-
rental rights to the birth father and his wife." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1445 (6th
ed. 1990). There are now two forms of surrogacy arrangements: "'traditional' surro-
gacy" and " 'gestational' surrogacy." See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr.
2d 893, 894 (Ct. App. 1994) (describing the two forms of surrogacy).
Traditional surrogacy is encompassed by the above definition and is the most
common form of surrogate arrangement. Here, the intended father and the surro-
gate mother are genetically related to the child. See id.; OTA REPORT, supra note 1,
at 267; DOLGIN, supra note 1, at 64 (describing traditional surrogacy arrangements);
KEANE & BREO, supra note 3, at 12. Once the child is born, the intended mother
usually adopts the child. See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 281 (stating that surro-
gacy contracts usually require the intended mother to adopt the child); YEH & YEH,
supra note 1, at 127. Further, in some cases both the genetic father and the in-
tended mother may have to adopt the child. See id. Alternatively, gestational surro-
gacy involves in vitro fertilization, whereby the embryo, formed with either the
sperm and egg of the intended parents or with donated gametes, is then trans-
planted into the surrogate. See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 267; PETER SINGER &
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duction that has become increasingly popular over the past few
years.' Although new reproductive methods enable couples who
were at one time destined to remain childless to begin a family,
the law has not advanced at the same pace.7 Many legislatures
DEANE WELLS, MAKING BABIES 96 (1985) (describing gestational surrogacy as "full
surrogacy" or as a "true surrogate pregnancy").
Interestingly, although IVF and cryopreservation have been available since the
1980s, and the first successful birth from a gestational surrogacy arrangement oc-
curred in 1985, little attention has been given to this form of surrogacy. See OTA
REPORT, supra note 1, at 127-28 (describing cryopreservation); Seibel, supra note 2,
at 22 (stating that the availability of IVF became widespread in the 1980s); see also
id. at 36. As of the printing of the sixth edition of Black's Law Dictionary in 1990,
gestational surrogacy was not included in the definition of surrogacy. The dictionary
does, however, define both "surrogate mother" and "surrogate parenting agreement"
without reference to gestational surrogacy. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1445 (6th
ed. 1990). Even as late as 1997, gestational surrogacy arrangements involving
anonymously donated material were described in legal writings as hypothetical
only. See, e.g., Denise E. Lascarides, Note, A Plea for the Enforceability of Gesta-
tional Surrogacy Contracts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1221, 1226 (1997) (referring to hy-
pothetical contracting parents as "Romeo and Juliet"). Cf YEH & YEH, supra note 1,
at 125 (defining gestational surrogacy as the impregnation of the surrogate with an
embryo formed from the sperm and egg of the intended parents, but not including
gamete donors as a possibility). It will be shown that this hypothetical situation
gave rise to real consequences for which no one was prepared. See infra notes 13-29
and accompanying text.
6 See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 267-68 (reporting that the Baby M litiga-
tion "thrust surrogate motherhood squarely into the national consciousness" and
increased inquiries into surrogate matching services); Lori B. Andrews & Wendy K.
Mariner, National Conference on Birth, Death, and Law, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 403, 415
(1989) (acknowledging that surrogacy arrangements have become more visible be-
cause of the Baby M case); Keith J. Hey, Assisted Conception and Surro-
gacy-Unfinished Business, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 775, 776 n. 3 (1993) (stating
that since the mid-1980s, surrogacy arrangements have become a popular issue for
the general public).
Although the popularity of surrogacy arrangements is relatively new, it is one
of the oldest forms of reproductive methods. See DOLGIN, supra note 1, at 64 (de-
scribing the biblical event of the birth of Abraham's son through the use of Sara's
servant as a surrogate mother); SINGER & WELLS, supra note 5, at 93 (acknowledg-
ing that surrogate motherhood has been used since Biblical times and is not really a
new reproductive method).
See, e.g., Gregory A. Triber, Growing Pains: Disputes Surrounding Human
Reproductive Interests Stretch the Boundaries of Traditional Legal Concepts, 23
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 103, 115-16 (1998) ("Because the issues surrounding repro-
ductive rights are emotional and controversial, most lawmakers are hesitant to en-
act laws that regulate assisted reproduction or restrict an individual's fundamental
right to procreate."); Jerald V. Hale, Note, From Baby M. to Jaycee B.: Fathers,
Mothers, and Children in the Brave New World, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 335, 336 (1998)
(noting the "widening gap" between medical technology and the law concerning as-
sisted reproduction); Annas, supra note 4, at D1 (criticizing the current lack of
regulation in the reproductive industry and lack of protection for children born
through these practices, and asserting that "it will take federal legislation to move
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have failed to enact laws8 governing these medical practices and
surrogacy arrangements;9 rather, they rely on the courts to han-
dle disputes on a case by case basis.1" Until recently, surrogacy
cases involving a dispute over parentage have involved at least
one person who was genetically related to the child and could
therefore exert legal parental rights.1 In fact, in most cases, the
child has had too many parents. 2 Jaycee B. v. Superior Court of
children to the center of consideration in the infertility business"); David E. Loder &
Lisa W. Clark, In Gestational Surrogacies, All Parties Must Bear Risk-A Child Ge-
netically Related to Both Parents Can Be Born To A Surrogate, Raising Myriad Le-
gal Issues Governed by Nascent Statutes, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 9, 1996, at B7 ("Many of
these issues are only beginning to be addressed by the legislatures and courts. The
result is a confusing patchwork of laws and practices."); David E. Rovella, Six De-
grees of Parental Separation, California Appeals Court to Hear Donor-Surrogacy
Case, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 27, 1997, at A7 (stating that the law has adapted to new re-
productive technologies at a slow pace).
a See Keith Alan Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: A Growing Need
for Consumer-Oriented Regulation of the In Vitro Fertilization Industry, 18 J. LEGAL
MED. 265, 294 (1997) (noting that most states have failed to legislate in the area of
in vitro fertilization); Hale, supra note 7, at 344 n.62 (listing 32 states that have not
enacted surrogacy laws); Loder & Clark, supra note 7, at B10 (noting that there is "a
large number of states that have not yet spoken on surrogacy, including Maryland,
Oregon, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Vermont").
Surrogacy agreements have been called both social and contractual arrange-
ments. Those that are contractual in nature usually involve a fee to be paid to the
surrogate for carrying the child. The surrogate may be a person not known by, or
related to, the intended parents. There are a number of surrogate matching services
that will provide a prospective couple with lists of available surrogates. See OTA
REPORT, supra note 1, at 267, 270 (describing commercial surrogacy arrangements
and discussing surrogate matching services); YEH & YEH, supra note 1, at 126. In
some states, the payment of a fee to a surrogate is illegal. Therefore, couples often
leave the state in order to obtain a surrogate agreement. See SINGER &WELLS, su-
pra note 5, at 95 (noting that "without offering a fee it could take a long time to find
a woman who would act as a surrogate"). Surrogacy agreements that are termed so-
cial arrangements are those where there is no fee involved, and the surrogate may
be a friend of, or related to, the intended parents. See DOLGIN, supra note 1, at 65.
Further, the surrogate in such a social arrangement may have purely altruistic rea-
sons for engaging in the contract. See infra note 67.
10 See infra Part II.
See Jaycee B. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 695 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting
that "this surrogacy case would seem to be the most extraordinary to date").12 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (involving a surrogate
who carried child who was biologically related to both intended parents and claimed
parental rights to child); In re Baby M, 542 A.2d 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988)
(involving a surrogate who was artificially inseminated with sperm of intended fa-
ther and claimed parental rights to child); see also McDonald v. McDonald, 608
N.Y.S.2d 477 (2d Dep't 1994) (describing divorce action whereby children born from
sperm of intended father/husband and egg of a female donor implanted in
mother/wife were claimed to be children of father, but not gestational mother/wife);
In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994) (involving a father
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Orange County13 involved the situation courts and commentators
were dreading. ' The legal fate of children born pursuant to ges-
tational surrogacy arrangements could no longer be avoided.
John and Luanne Buzzanca entered into a gestational sur-
rogacy contract with a surrogate and her husband. Pursuant to
the contract, a sperm and an egg from anonymous donors were
united and implanted in the surrogate, who was to carry the fe-
tus to term and then release the baby to the intended parents,
John and Luanne. 5 The contract was signed by John and
Luanne Buzzanca, and by the surrogate and her husband." One
month prior to the child's birth John Buzzanca filed for divorce
and alleged that "there were no minor children" from the mar-
riage. Luanne Buzzanca filed a response stating that although
there were presently no minor children, she and John were " 'ex-
pecting a child by way of surrogate contract.' "'" Jaycee Louise
Buzzanca was born on April 26, 1995, and was given to Luanne
by the surrogate in accordance with the contract terms. Luanne
then filed for sole custody of Jaycee and sought pendente lite
child support payments from John while awaiting final adjudica-
tion of the divorce action." John acknowledged that he signed
the contract, but declared that the California Family Court
lacked jurisdiction to force him to pay because Jaycee was not a
"child of the marriage" within the meaning of the California
Family Code.' The trial court concluded it did not have jurisdic-
and surrogate mother of a child born through traditional surrogacy arrangement
who both sought custody based on genetic link to child).
13 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (Ct. App. 1996).
14 See Judy Peres, Surrogacy Case Breeds New Legal Dilemma, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
11, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 3587510 ("This is the nightmare case that eve-
ryone was dreading.") (quoting R. Alta Charo, Professor of Law and Medical Ethics
at the University of Wisconsin).
"' See Jaycee, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697. The contract stated that "[the child [was]
to be taken into the home of the Intended Father and Intended Mother and raised
by them as their child, without interference by the Surrogate [Pamela] or her hus-
band, and without retention or assertion by the Surrogate and her husband of any
parental rights." Id. (internal quotes omitted).
16 See id. In most surrogacy arrangements, the husband of the surrogate must
expressly refuse to consent to the insemination of his wife. This is because the law
in most jurisdictions presumes that the husband of a woman who gives birth is the
legal father of the child. See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 273; DOLGIN, supra note
1, at 65.
17 Jaycee, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697.
"8 See id. at 696-97.
'9 Id. at 696. California Family Code section 2010 states, in pertinent part:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage.., the court has jurisdiction to
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tion over John, and thus he was not required to make any sup-
port payments for Jaycee.2' Further, the trial judge asserted
that in order for Luanne to prevail, she would need to get a pro-
bate court decree declaring that she and John had legally
adopted Jaycee.21 The trial court postponed a final determina-
tion pending review.'
In a detailed opinion, the California Court of Appeals re-
versed the trial court decision and declared that the family court
had jurisdiction to impose pendente lite child support payments
on John Buzzanca.2 The court held that Luanne had made a
sufficient showing that John would likely be held to be Jaycee's
father.2' In granting Luanne's application, the court relied on
inquire into and render any judgment and make orders that are appropri-
ate concerning the following-
(a) ....
(b) The custody of minor children of the marriage.
(c) The support of children for whom support may be ordered, includ-
ing children born after the filing of the initial petition or the final de-
cree of dissolution.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2010 (Deering Supp. 1999).
'0 See Jaycee, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697.
21 See id. at 696. The trial judge neglected to address the fact that John could
not be forced to adopt Jaycee. See id The difficulties this "remedy" poses are dis-
cussed infra note 31.
See Jaycee, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696.
See id. at 702.
2In its discussion, the court first established that it was not deciding whether
John conclusively was Jaycee's father, nor was it deciding the legal effect of the sur-
rogacy contract. See id at 700-01. Significantly, there is a distinction between de-
ciding a factual dispute, on the one hand, and deciding the legal effect of an event,
on the other, in determining whether pendente lite support- should be granted.
Where there is a factual dispute, the moving party must first establish the existence
of the fact by a preponderance of the evidence before pendente lite support will be
ordered. See id. at 700; Hite v. Hite, 57 P. 227, 228-29 (Cal. 1899) (holding that in a
pendente lite application for alimony where the "husband" denies the existence of
the marriage, the "wife" must prove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence
before she can receive support). Alternatively, where there is no factual dispute as
to an event but the legal significance of the event is in question, pendente lite sup-
port will be granted if the event is sufficient to show, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the claimant's assertion. The undisputed existence of facts pertaining to the
event is enough to grant the order, even though a court may later determine the
event is legally invalid. See Jaycee, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700; Bancroft v. Bancroft 50
P.2d 465, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935) (holding that in a pendente lite proceeding for
alimony, because the legal significance of a marriage was in question but not its fac-
tual existence, the court was justified in granting the support application). In
reaching its decision, the court in Bancroft stated, "there will not be need that the
fact... be so conclusively established .... It is for the interest of society and in aid
of public policy that, where the.., relation has been in fact assumed, it should not
easily and capriciously be laid aside." Id. at 467 (quoting Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50
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the only gestational surrogacy case decided by the California Su-
preme Court to date, Johnson v. Calvert.' The Johnson court ul-
timately relied on the intention of the parties to the surrogacy
contract to determine the legal parentage of the child born pur-
suant to the contract.' The Jaycee court read the holding of
Johnson broadly to conclude that the intentions of John and
Luanne to raise Jaycee, coupled with the intention of the surro-
gate not to raise Jaycee, were sufficient to show that John would
most likely be deemed Jaycee's father.27 Therefore, the court was
justified in granting the pendente lite child support application.
When the custody issue subsequently went before the trial
judge, he "reached an extraordinary conclusion: Jaycee had no
lawful parents."' He ordered that John Buzzanca was not Jay-
cee's legal father, 9 and was therefore not required to make any
further child support payments for her to Luanne.0 Additionally,
N.Y. 184, 193-94 (1879)). This quote seems extremely appropriate here, as a con-
trary decision would deprive Jaycee of the immediate support that is owed to her,
and more importantly, that she needs and deserves.
Here, had John denied the existence of the contract, Luanne would have been
obligated to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was Jaycee's father.
This would have been virtually impossible absent the signed contract, because John
is not genetically linked to Jaycee. Since it was undisputed that John Buzzanca
signed the contract, the court needed to determine merely whether he would likely
be held to be Jaycee's father given the signed surrogacy agreement. See Jaycee, 49
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700-01. As this was a pendente lite application for child support,
the court had to decide whether, given the signed surrogacy agreement, "it [was]
likelk that John [would] ultimately be held to be the father." Id. at 701.
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). For a factual description of the Johnson case, see
infra note 89 and accompanying text.
26 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
17 See Jaycee, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702. Another complicating aspect of this case
was that the only person who could claim legal rights to Jaycee, the surrogate
mother, did not want to exercise those rights. See id. at 701 (noting that the surro-
gate mother "never contemplated keeping the child"); Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, No.
95D002992 (Cal. Fam. Ct. Aug. 29, 1997) (discussing how Pamela and Randy Snell
voluntarily abandoned their petition to establish parentage, and verifying that they
had no biological and genetic relationship to Jaycee); see also Peres, supra note 14,
at 1 (reporting on the Jaycee case and stating that "the birth mother [ I] irrevocably
waived her claim"); Rovella, supra note 7, at A7 (stating that the surrogate and her
husband had at first sought custody, but then dropped their claim).
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (1998). The trial court
had accepted the stipulation that neither the surrogate mother nor her husband
were the "biological" parents. See id. Luanne was deemed not to be the mother be-
cause she had neither contributed the egg nor given birth. See id.
" John was not the father because he had not contributed the sperm and thus
had no biological relationship with Jaycee. See id.
8o See id.
39 CATHOLIC LAWYER, NOs. 2-3
the court ordered that Luanne Buzzanca was not entitled to be
declared Jaycee's legal mother.31
When Jaycee's case came back to the California Appellate
Court, the trial judge, not surprisingly, reversed the ruling and
John and Luanne were declared Jaycee's legal parents.' 2 Based
on an analogy to California's artificial insemination statute, the
court held:
The same rule which makes a husband the lawful father of a
child born because of his consent to artificial insemination
should be applied here .... Just as a husband is deemed to be
the lawful father of a child unrelated to him when his wife gives
birth after artificial insemination, so should a husband and wife
be deemed the lawful parents of a child after a surrogate bears a
biologically unrelated child on their behalf.
3
The appellate court criticized the family court judge for
reading the California Family Code too narrowly and for reach-
ing the ludicrous result of putting the burden of Jaycee's support
on the taxpayers, while at the same time relieving John and
Luanne of any responsibility to her.3' Under California Family
Code section 7610(a), a parent-child relationship can be estab-
lished between the mother and the child by "proof of [the mother]
3' See id. The trial judge relied on California Family Code Section 7611(d) and
determined that even if Luanne might be presumed the mother, the presumption
was rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See id. The "evidence" relied upon to
make this determination was the lack of a genetic link between Luanne and Jaycee,
that Luanne did not give birth to Jaycee, and had made no attempt to adopt her. See
id. Section 7611(d) of the California Family Code relates to presumption of paternity
and provides that "[a] man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he
meets the conditions provided.., in any of the following subdivisions: .... (d) He
receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child."
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (Deering 1996). The trial judge declined to apply this
provision to Luanne stating that "[tihere are inherent differences between men and
women as to the application of § 7611(d)." Buzzanca, at 3.
It appears illogical for Luanne to have to adopt Jaycee to become her legal
mother. If she does, then it follows that John has to adopt her as well to become the
legal father. This procedure allows these "fathers," or mothers if it were the case, to
escape any obligations to the child by simply refusing to adopt, since a court cannot
force the adoption. See supra note 21. Luanne Buzzanca and the guardian ad litem
for Jaycee appealed this decision to the California Court of Appeals. See In re Mar-
riage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998); see also infra notes 32-44
and accompanying text.
32 See Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280. The same justice who had
written the first appellate opinion wrote this opinion as well. See Jaycee B. v. Supe-
rior Ct., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (Ct. App. 1996).
Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
4 See id
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having given birth to the child, or under this part."35 As between
the father and the child, section 7610(b) provides that proof of
the relationship can be established, "under this part."6 The
court held that "under this part" included the artificial insemina-
tion section of the Family Code, which provides that as long as
the husband consents to his wife's artificial insemination, the
husband becomes the natural father of the resulting child under
the law.37 The court concluded that although only the husband
was mentioned, the statute could be extended to include both
husbands and wives who consent to in vitro fertilization of a sur-
rogate using a sperm and egg from anonymous donors.3" The
court stated that although this procedure was not contemplated
by the legislature, gestational surrogacy was similar to artificial
insemination in that "[b]oth contemplate the procreation of a
child by the consent to a medical procedure of someone who in-
tends to raise the child but who otherwise does not have any
biological tie."39 The court decided that since the legislature did
provide for a form of artificial reproduction where at least one
parent had no biological tie to the child, it should naturally be
applicable to the situation where neither parent has a biological
connection. 0
Once the appellate court determined that Luanne could es-
tablish maternity under the relevant statutes, it next had to de-
termine which of the two people who could claim parental status,
the surrogate or Luanne, should be declared Jaycee's legal
mother.4' Relying on Johnson v. Calvert,42 the court used the in-
tent to procreate standard to "break the tie" and declare Luanne
Jaycee's legal mother.43 Additionally, the court held that John's
sr CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (Deering 1996 & Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
36 Id. § 7610(b). See Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284 (setting forth
the statute's relevant portion).
37 See Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285 (noting that a genetic rela-
tionship is not necessary, as there are other ways to establish paternity under the
code).
38 See id. at 282 (stating "[in] each instance, a child is procreated because a
medical procedure was initiated and consented to by intended parents. The only dif-
ference is that in this case-unlike artificial insemination-there is no reason to dis-
tinguish between husband and wife").
s9 Id. at 286.
40 See id.
41 As stated earlier, the surrogate could claim legal status because she had given
birth to Jaycee. See supra note 27.
42 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
See Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288. The court stated that
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paternity was established in the same manner as Luanne's ma-
ternity. Thus, he was unable to escape his parental responsibili-
ties of providing for the child he created."
The decision of the Orange County Family Law Court judge
presents the clearest example of the legal system's deficiency in
the area of gestational surrogacy." It is abhorrent that a two
year old child could be declared a legal orphan when the people
who brought about her existence were alive and perfectly capable
of supporting her.'6 Specifically, in California the validity and
enforceability of surrogacy contracts has volleyed between the
courts and the legislature.' The courts have made individual
case determinations, but have deferred the regulatory question
to the legislature." In turn, when the legislature attempted to
pass a regulatory law, the governor vetoed it stating, "[olnly two
published court opinions in California have treated this nettle-
some subject .... Comprehensive regulation of this difficult
Luanne's situation was not a true tie-breaker because the surrogate had made no
attempt to gain custody of Jaycee. See id. More importantly, the surrogate had spe-
cifically relinquished all possible claims to her. See supra note 29.
" See Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294.
4 One argument has been made that declaring a child a "legal orphan" denies
the child equal protection under the laws. See Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1304
(Conn. 1998) (claiming that the trial court's failure to assert jurisdiction over the
custody proceeding was a denial of the child's equal protection right).
*6 There is no evidence in either the appellate decision or the trial order that
would call into question the capability of either John or Luanne to support Jaycee.
See Jaycee B. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (Ct. App. 1996); Buzzanca v. Buz-
zanca, No. 95D002992 (Cal. Fam. Ct. Aug. 29, 1997).
Although Jaycee technically would not have been born without the anonymous
sperm and egg donors and the surrogate Pamela, this author does not consider them
to be the people who brought about her birth. While any sperm/egg combination and
any healthy, willing surrogate would have been adequate to cause the birth of a
child, it was specifically John and Luanne Buzzanca who desired a child and sought
out a surrogate who gave birth to Jaycee. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does it
Mean to be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 415 (1991) (arguing that while any gestational host or gamete
provider will suffice to produce a child, only the intended parents "stand [ I in the
relationship with the child of being the but for cause of the child's existence") (em-
phasis in original).
47 See Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293 (calling on the legislature
to give guidance in the area of gestational surrogacy); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d
776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (noting that the legislature should be called upon to resolve this
issue).
4 As in its prior decision, the appellate court here was not concerned with the
enforceability or validity of the surrogacy contract. Rather, it was "concerned with
the consequences of those agreements as acts which caused the birth of a child."
Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289.
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moral issue is premature .... To the extent surrogacy continues
to be practical, it can be governed by the legal framework al-
ready established in the family law area." 9
To protect fully the welfare of children born pursuant to ges-
tational surrogacy contracts, the procedure must be regulated
and uniform legislation should be imposed.' Moreover, legisla-
tion would ensure that the parties to the contract are aware of
their rights and responsibilities before they enter the contract
and before the child is born, and would create consistency and
predictability for future parties who choose this reproductive
method. The moral issues associated with gestational surrogacy,
while clearly of utmost importance, are beyond the scope of this
paper. The fact remains that children are born using these
methods and, thus, their physical and emotional well-being must
be protected to the greatest extent possible. This is true regard-
less of whether these contracts are ultimately held to be legal.
Part I of this Comment addresses a proposed argument for
the constitutional validity of surrogacy contracts. Part II exam-
ines the current state of surrogacy in our legal system, and the
different ways courts and legislatures have addressed the issues
that have come before them. Part III analyzes the Buzzanca de-
cision and argues that in the absence of a state regulation, the
intent to procreate standard should be used to protect the inter-
ests of a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrange-
ment. Part IV asserts that uniform legislation is urgently
needed to prevent outcomes detrimental to children such as Jay-
cee, who are born pursuant to gestational surrogacy arrange-
ments.
49 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783 (quoting Governor Wilson's veto message, SEN. BILL
No. 937 (Sept. 26, 1992) Sen. Daily File (1991-92 Reg. Sess.) p. 68); id at 787 (de-
claring 'lilt is not the role of the judiciary to inhibit the use of reproductive technol-
ogy when the Legislature has not seen fit to do so .... [r)ather, our task has been to
resolve the dispute before us"); id. at 788 (Arabian, J., concurring) (cautioning "I
would not move beyond the available legal mechanism into such socially and morally
unchartered waters .... To date, the legislative process has failed to produce a sat-
isfactory answer. This court should be chastened and not emboldened by that fail-
ure").
50 See Hey, supra note 6, at 811 (stating that "[sitatutory enactments on surro-
gacy arrangements should not be adopted in a vacuum; such legislation needs to be
part of a thorough statutory scheme regulating both the medical technologies and
the contractual aftermaths"); see also Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293
(declaring that the legislature should enact laws regulating these methods of repro-
duction because it is better suited to "lawmaking" than the courts, and legislation
would create predictability for parties who use these reproductive methods).
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SURROUNDING SURROGACY
CONTRACTS
The United States Supreme Court has not yet been faced
with deciding the legality of either of the two types of surrogacy
contracts." As a result, unanswered questions remain concern-
ing the constitutionality of surrogacy contracts in their relation
to the fundamental rights of procreation and privacy. The right
to procreation has been interpreted as a basic human fundamen-
tal right implied by the United States Constitution. 52 The Su-
preme Court has also concluded that the constitutional right of
privacy includes the right to procreate.53 One argument sup-
porting the constitutionality of surrogacy contracts is that if one
has the freedom to procreate, then by extension one should also
have the freedom to choose how procreation will occur.' This ar-
51 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing the two types of surro-
gacy arrangements).52 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding unconstitutional
a state statute that permitted involuntary sterilization of criminals); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating in dicta that an individual has a constitu-
tional right to "marry, establish a home and bring up children"). The Skinner Court
stated, "[wie are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race." Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. The result of allowing one to be in-
voluntarily sterilized is that one would be "forever deprived of a basic liberty." Id.
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.") (emphasis in original). This
holding was an extension of Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court held that a
state law forbidding the use of contraceptives by married couples was "unconstitu-
tionally intrud[ing] upon the right of marital privacy." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
" See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 410 (1983) (stating that "[there is]
an important distinction about procreative freedom: choices about who may con-
ceive, bear, or rear a child are distinct from choices about the conduct that occurs in
the process of conceiving, bearing, and rearing. In other words, the freedom to pro-
create is distinct from freedom in procreation.") (emphasis in original). Further-
more, that freedom "may be of great significance to individuals and may also de-
serve protection." Id.; see also In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128, 1164 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1987) (asserting that "if one has a right to procreate coitally, then one has
the right to reproduce non-coitally. If it is the reproduction that is protected, then
the means of reproduction are also to be protected"). Although the New Jersey Su-
preme Court ultimately found the surrogacy contract invalid, see In re Baby M., 537
A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988), the lower court's discussion of the constitutional issues
surrounding surrogacy contracts is a strong argument for their validity and enforce-
ability. Additionally, see Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (upholding
contract between parties relating to disposition of frozen pre-zygotes and stating,
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gument appears to have merit when one considers that infertile
couples have the same desires to have and to raise children of
their own as do fertile couples.' Infertile couples should not be
forced to give up their fundamental right to procreate when
available medical technology and social agreements can allow
them to enjoy the same rights as couples who are fertile." As
one state court stated, "[to the extent possible, it should be the
progenitors-not the state and not the courts-who by their prior
directive make this deeply personal life choice."57 Moreover,
should gestational surrogacy contracts ultimately be viewed as a
way of equating infertile couples with fertile couples, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would prevent
a state from banning or unduly restricting their use, absent a
compelling state interest.
5 8
"[aidvance directives, subject to mutual change of mind that must be jointly ex-
pressed, both minimize misunderstandings and maximize procreative liberty by re-
serving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the first instance a quin-
tessentially personal, private decision").
See Robertson, supra note 54, at 428 (stating that "[an infertile couple's in-
terest in genetic continuity, in gestating and giving birth, and in rearing the off-
spring is identical to the interest of a fertile couple"); Baby M., 525 A.2d at 1164
(positing that "[tihe value and interests underlying the creation of family are the
same by whatever means obtained").
' See Robertson, supra note 54, at 428 (asserting that "[blecause fertile married
persons have the right to add children to the family, infertile married persons must
have it as well: a legal distinction based on the natural lottery of physical equipment
is not reasonable"). In his article, Professor Robertson argues that freedom in pro-
creation should also extend to allow infertile couples to use assisted reproductive
technology to select the gender and genetic characteristics of their child. See id. at
430. This is not a proper purpose for using assisted reproductive technologies. If
people who can reproduce by coital techniques do not have the option of choosing
which traits are passed on to their child, then couples who seek to use non-coital
techniques should not have that option either. Non-coital techniques should only be
used to enable infertile couples to achieve equal footing with those who are able to
exercise the constitutional right of freedom to procreate. The moral issue of tailoring
embryos with more desirable genetic traits and characteristics, however, is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
57 Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (upholding intent of parties as stated in contract to
determine disposition of cryopreserved pre-zygotes).
5 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (declaring that classifications of per-
sons "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of differ-
ence having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons are similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike") (quoting Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). But see Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177 (assert-
ing, in a custody dispute over cryopreserved zygotes, that a woman's right to privacy
and bodily integrity is not at issue until zygote implantation occurs); Doe v. Atty.
Gen. of Michigan, 487 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that the
legislature has a compelling interest in regulating surrogacy contracts sufficient to
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This paper may appear contradictory in suggesting that ges-
tational surrogacy contracts may be constitutional as an exten-
sion of the right to procreate, while simultaneously arguing that
uniform legislation is needed to govern their use and to protect
the children born pursuant to such contracts. Regulating surro-
gacy contracts, however, would not infringe upon one's constitu-
tional right to freedom of procreation. Rather, it protects the
children born as a result of these contracts after procreation has
already occurred.9 In the Buzzanca case, Luanne and John Buz-
zanca exercised their fundamental right to procreate through the
use of a surrogacy contract. To prevent Jaycee from being de-
prived of the responsibility owed to her by John and Luanne, the
couple's intent to bring about her existence had to be the deter-
minative factor in deciding her legal parentage after her concep-
tion. Additionally, legislation is necessary to prevent "fathers"
like John Buzzanca from escaping their parental responsibilities
to a child they are responsible for creating.' Unfortunately, un-
til the Supreme Court decides this constitutional issue, the indi-
vidual states will continue to determine the validity of these ar-
rangements. Some states may continue to provide for the
welfare of a child created through surrogacy contracts, regard-
less of their validity.
II. THE TANGLED WEB OF SURROGACY LAWS
A. State Legislation
State legislation concerning surrogacy contracts varies
widely. Some states explicitly allow surrogacy contracts,"1 while
justify intruding upon a person's right to procreate).
69 See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 223 (declaring that although a right may be
deemed fundamental, it may still be subject to regulation by the state); Robertson,
supra note 54, at 433 (acknowledging that even if the right to procreation includes
the right to use non-coital methods, that right is not unlimited and may be subject
to state regulation if there is a compelling state interest).
60 Similarly, mothers who seek to evade their obligations under a surrogacy con-
tract should be prevented from doing so as well.
8' See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1997) (providing for gestational sur-
rogacy contracts only when the intended mother cannot gestate a child, or to do so
would present a serious health risk to either her or the child). The statute further
provides that any surrogacy contract must contain provisions which state that the
gestational surrogate agrees to relinquish all parental rights to the child upon birth,
and the intended parents are to assume all parental rights and responsibilities upon
the child's birth regardless of whether the child has any impairment. See id.; see
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others explicitly prohibit them.' Those prohibiting surrogacy
may, in some cases, also attach civil or criminal penalties to per-
sons entering into these arrangements.' Interestingly, the ma-
jority of states have not addressed surrogacy at all." For exam-
ple, California adopted the Uniform Parentage Act, which was
enacted specifically to abolish the distinction of children's rights
based on their legitimate or illegitimate status, and instead de-
termines rights and responsibilities based on whether a parent-
child relationship exists.6 The Uniform Parentage Act was not
meant to deal with parentage issues in surrogacy contracts. In
fact, surrogacy was not even contemplated by its drafters.6
Thus, although the trial judge in Buzzanca erred in his decision,
also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210-26.26.260 (West 1997) (allowing surrogacy
contracts except when the surrogate mother is under the age of 18 or suffers from a
mental illness or disability); ARK CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998) (providing for
the legality of surrogacy contracts where the surrogate is artificially inseminated).
0 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1998) (declaring
that surrogate parenting arrangements are contrary to public policy and are there-
fore void and unenforceable); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (Michie 1995) (stating
that any artificial or assisted method of reproduction is illegal). In Utah, if a child is
born pursuant to an illegal surrogacy contract, the child is considered the legal child
of the gestating mother and if she is married, her husband is the legal father. See
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7204(3); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (West 1991
& Supp. 1998) (providing that surrogacy arrangements are prohibited, and any child
born pursuant to such an arrangement is the child of the surrogate mother). In
1994, however, this statute was declared unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals of
Arizona in Soos v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz.
App. 1994).
U See, e.g., N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 123 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1998) (imposing
a civil penalty on any party that attempts to engage in a surrogacy contract for a
fee); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(1)(d) (declaring that violation of this section is a
class B misdemeanor); see also MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.248(155)-(159) (Law. Co-op.
1992) (declaring surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable as against public policy,
and making a violation of the law a felony). Cf. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.250
(allowing the enforcement of surrogacy contracts but making the entrance into a
surrogacy contract for money a gross misdemeanor).
See generally Loder & Clark, supra note 7, at B7 (giving examples of various
state statutes governing surrogacy); The American Surrogacy Center, TASC Legal
Map at <http:/www.surrogacy.com/legals/map.html> (showing what the position
each state has taken on surrogacy, whether it has been banned, allowed, or not ad-
dressed).
65 See UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287, 289 (West
1987) (noting that the Act provides substantive legal equality for children, no matter
what the marital status of their parents); id. § 2 at 296 (stating that both legitimate
and illegitimate children are extended equal parent and child relationships).
See id. § 5 at 302 (indicating that this Act does not reach many of the complex
problems involved with artificial insemination); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,
779 (Cal. 1993) (realizing that since surrogacy was unknown in 1975 when the Act
was passed, it could not have been a motivation for the drafters).
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it is understandable why he chose not to follow Johnson. His ul-
timate conclusion, however, was outrageous. Aside from the fac-
tual dissimilarities, the Uniform Parentage Act, construed in
Johnson, was not directly applicable.
Those states in favor of banning surrogacy contracts argue
that they exploit and commodify women and are akin to "baby-
selling.""7 Arguably, banning surrogacy could actually encourage
the type of commodification and baby selling that is sought to be
prevented. Banning surrogacy would drive desperate couples
underground to seek to obtain a child of their own.' Further,
willing surrogates, knowing surrogacy is the only way the couple
could have a child, would be able to take advantage of these des-
(7 Hill, supra note 46, at 409-10 (stating that the exploitation argument is
premised on the idea that women agree to become surrogates because of their social
or economic disadvantage, and that these arguments make "frequent allusions to...
prostitution, and baby-selling"); Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding
Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 127, 143 (1986) (arguing that commercialized
surrogacy encourages people to think of babies as goods that can be bought and
sold); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1932
(1987) (stating that the concerns about commodification of women and children stem
from "the danger that women's attributes, such as height, eye color, race, intelli-
gence, and athletic ability, will be monetized. Surrogates with 'better' qualities will
command higher prices in virtue of those qualities"). O'Brien further argues that
"[mlaking this form of trade routine would alter social perceptions of children; ba-
bies, like automobiles, stock, and pedigreed dogs, will be viewed quantitatively, as
merchandise that can be acquired, at market or discount rates." O'Brien, supra, at
144.
The proponents of these arguments, however, do not recognize that some people
who become surrogate mothers have a purely altruistic motive. See Radin, supra, at
1932-33 (stating that, "there are some situations in which a surrogate can be un-
derstood to be proceeding out of love or altruism and not out of economic necessity
or desire for monetary gain"). Radin's solution is a compromise between the two fac-
tions by proposing that paid surrogacy contracts should be prohibited, but non-paid
surrogacy should be permitted. See id.; see also Maureen Downey, A Site for Surro-
gacy, ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION, Jul. 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL
3982632 (quoting a woman who became a surrogate mother because, "[I] have the
feeling that [I] easily became pregnant and had [my] bab[y], and [I] want to help
someone who hasn't been able to do that").
" See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 280 (acknowledging that when prenatal
independent adoptions were declared unenforceable, the practice still continued).
The court in In re Buzzanca recognized that banning surrogacy would not solve the
problem the courts and legislatures face when it stated:
Even if all means of artificial reproduction were outlawed with draconian
criminal penalties visited on the doctors and parties involved, courts will
still be called upon to decide who the lawful parents really are and who-
other than the taxpayers-is obligated to provide maintenance and support
for the child. These cases will not go away.
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998).
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perate couples by charging extortionate sums of money as pay-
ment for their services. 9 Some states that explicitly ban surro-
gacy provide that a child born pursuant to such an illegal agree-
ment is automatically the child of the surrogate, and the
surrogate must assume all rights and responsibilities for the
child.7° Thus, should a party breach the contract, the surrogate
becomes the mother of a child she had no intention of raising,
while the intended couple is left without a child. This situation
may lead such a couple to enter yet another illegal arrangement
to achieve their goal.71 More disturbingly, the child may be
raised by the surrogate mother or couple who may not have
wanted the child, and who may then resent having to raise the
child. These hostile feelings could be directed at the child in the
form of neglect or even physical abuse.72
Most states allowing surrogacy do not speak specifically to
gestational surrogacy contracts where both anonymous sperm
and egg donors are used.7" Problems then arise in interpreting
6' See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case For Full Contractual Enforce-
ment, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2319 (1995) (stating that "[n]o one thinks that surrogate
arrangements are a first choice. They are a desperate last hope, often for couples
who have tried for years to conceive without success .... ). Further, if surrogacy
contracts were outlawed, the couple's only remaining hope would be to adopt. The
difficulties with this option were discussed supra note 3.
70 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(a) (Michie 1995).
7' Another consequence of being unable to have children is strain on the mar-
riage that could lead to divorce. See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (describing
emotional effects of infertility, such as "marital strife" and "family disharmony,"
which affects both the individual infertile person and the married couple); O'Brien,
supra note 67, at 129 (stating that "[m] any couples whose parental aspirations have
been thwarted by infertility suffer enormous personal anguish and even marital con-
flict").
72 See Reist v. Bay County Circuit Judge, 241 N.W.2d 55, 69 (Mich. 1976) (Cole-
man, J., concurring) (stating that "some children are unwanted and cruelly rejected
by parents"). Cf Epstein, supra note 69, at 2320 (positing that if surrogacy ar-
rangements were allowed, the risk of child abuse to children might be considerably
lower as compared to the risk to children in both stable or broken homes who were
naturally conceived). Professor Epstein argues that '[ilt hardly seems likely that a
couple that endured so much grief to have its own child would embark on a course of
abuse and neglect with a surrogate child." Id.
73 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(3)(e) (West 1997) (providing that "[a] ges-
tational surrogacy contract must include the following provisions: .... The gesta-
tional surrogate agrees to assume parental rights and responsibilities for the child
born to her if it is determined that neither member of the commissioning couple is
the genetic parent of the child"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1993) (provid-
ing explicitly for surrogacy arrangements performed through artificial insemination
by intended father or anonymous donor, but silent regarding gestational surrogacy
either through the sperm and egg of the intended parents, or through anonymous
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the existing statute: is this type of surrogacy contract prohibited
because it was not specifically provided for in the statute, or was
the use of anonymous sperm and egg donors not foreseen by the
legislature? This lack of specificity leads to the same ambigui-
ties regarding the parties' rights and responsibilities when
forming the contract as do those statutes articulating the state's
position with respect to banned surrogacy agreements. If parties
to the contract are not sure of the state's position should one
party attempt to breach, they risk the possibility that, at trial, a
court may not enforce that party's expectations.7' States, either
not providing for gestational surrogacy contracts in their existing
statutes, or simply not legislating as to this issue whatsoever,
are forced to apply case law in determining these issues. Cali-
fornia, exercising jurisdiction in Jaycee, is one such state without
legislation regarding surrogacy agreements.75
B. Case Law
Case law involving surrogacy contracts is relatively new and
limited.7" In determining issues such as custody and parentage
of children born as a result of assisted reproductive methods,
three principles have been employed: the "best interests of the
child" standard, equitable estoppel, and the "intent to procreate"
standard. Arguably, it is the intent to procreate standard that
should govern surrogacy contracts. This was the standard em-
ployed by the appellate court in deciding Buzzanca.77
The "best interests of the child" standard has commonly
been applied in determining custody and adoption proceedings.78
donors).
14 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
75 The California courts have requested legislation in the surrogacy area on
more than one occasion. The California state assembly attempted to enact legisla-
tion but it was vetoed by Governor Pete Wilson. See Peres, supra note 14 (quoting
Jeffrey Doeringer, attorney for Jaycee Buzzanca).
76 See supra note 7.
77 See supra note 28.
78 See Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1322-23 (Conn. 1998) (using the best interest
of child standard to determine custody dispute over child born through artificial in-
semination of surrogate with husband's sperm); In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128, 1167
(N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 537 A.2d 1227, 1256 (N.J. 1988)
(defining best interests standard and stating that "the only rule of law by which this
court may be guided is the application of the doctrine of a child's best interests");
Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 488 (Cal. 1986) (stating that California law bases
decisions on the best interests of the child when there are competing parental
claims to custody); In re Custody of C.C.R.S., a Child, 892 P.2d 246, 256 (Colo. 1995)
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It is premised on the notion that the child's welfare should be the
controlling factor, above all other considerations, in determining
custody disputes."9 Factors considered in deciding the child's
best interests include whether the child was wanted, the emo-
tional stability of the people in the home, stability of the family,
ability of the parents to respond to the child's physical and emo-
tional needs, and family attitudes towards education.' Another
important factor considered is the psychological effect on the
child of removal from the child's current home."l Thus, if the
child's best interests call for the child to remain with the person
who has physical custody at the time of the proceeding, removal
will not be ordered. Conversely, if removal would be better for
the child, that becomes the overriding factor.
Equitable estoppel has been applied in the assisted repro-
duction area when, in the absence of a legal remedy, an equitable
remedy is imposed to create a just result. 2 Equitable estoppel
has been defined as "[a] remedy available if one party through
his course of conduct knowingly misleads or induces another
party to believe and act upon his conduct in good faith without
knowledge of the facts."' The doctrine has been used in divorce
and child support cases involving artificial insemination of the
(asserting that the child's best interest is the guiding principle in determining cus-
tody of a child); Soos v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (Gerber, J., concurring) (declaring that "the universal pattern
in [Arizona's] domestic relations law [is] to make the determination of the child's
custodian an evidentiary matter turning on the child's best interests"); see also
DOLGIN, supra note 1, at 213-14 (acknowledging that the best interest of the child
test "has been institutionalized almost a century for use in the resolution of family
law disputes involving children's parentage or custody").
79 See Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d at 258-59 (holding that the best interests of
the child determined that the child should remain with the psychological parents
instead of being returned to the biological parents); Baby M., 525 A.2d at 1167
(quoting Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429 (1925)) (stating that the courts "[do] not de-
termine the rights as between parent and child or as between either parent... but
rather 'interferes for the protection of infants'"). Cf Hill, supra note 46, at 400 (as-
serting that, "every state has recognized a presumption that it is in the best inter-
ests of the child to be placed with its natural parents").
See Baby M., 525 A.2d at 1167-68 (citing Dr. L. Salk, expert witness on issue
of best interests of child).
8' See Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d at 256-57 (stating that if removal of child
from third party's physical custody will cause adverse psychological and emotional
effects on the child, the child will remain with the third party) (citing Reflow v. Re-
flow. 545 P.2d 894, 901 (1976)).
See Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ind. 1994).
Levin, 645 N.E.2d at 604 (citing Paramo v. Edwards, 563 N.E.2d 595, 598
(Ind. 1990)).
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wife by a third party donor with the husband's consent. Upon
divorce, the husband may claim not to owe any child support be-
cause a genetic link between himself and the child is absent,
thus precluding him from being the legal father." To determine
whether the husband should be estopped from denying paternity,
the court has looked at the extent of the wife's reliance on her
husband's consent in deciding whether to go through with the
procedure. If an unconscionable result would be reached if held
otherwise, the husband would be estopped from denying legal
parentage and would have to support the child.' Although the
estoppel doctrine has only been applied to artificial insemination
cases thus far, the same equitable principles could also apply in
the context of gestational surrogacy.
The appellate court in Buzzanca recognized that John Buz-
zanca should be declared Jaycee's legal father under equitable
estoppel. Because his consent to the surrogacy arrangement
brought about Jaycee's existence, it would be unjust to allow him
to disclaim any and all responsibility for her care. If the court
extended the underlying principles of the artificial insemination
4 See id. at 603 (stating that wife bore a child after she was artificially insemi-
nated with sperm not of her husband). The father held the child out as his own for
15 years, but when the couple divorced, he contended that he did not have to pay
child support because he was not the child's biological father. The court rejected
Levin's claim based on equitable estoppel. See id. at 604-05; In re Marriage of Ad-
ams, 528 N.E.2d 1075, 1089 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (Dunn., J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that in divorce proceeding where child was conceived
through artificial insemination of wife, husband may be estopped from denying legal
responsibility for the child when he unequivocally consented to the insemination),
rev'd on other grounds, 551 N.E.2d 635 (Ill. 1990); see also Gursky v. Gursky, 242
N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (holding that husband who consented to his wife's
artificial insemination by the sperm of a third party had legal duty to support the
child).
See Levin, 645 N.E.2d at 604-05 (stating that husband consented to wife's in-
semination procedure, induced her to go through with it, held child out as his own
for 15 years, and led wife to believe they both would be responsible for the child's
support); Marriage of Adams, 528 N.E.2d at 1087 (asserting there was no evidence
which tended to show that the wife would have nevertheless gone through with the
insemination procedure without the consent of her husband). The appellate court
ultimately affirmed the trial court's finding of consent by the husband. See id.; see
also Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (declaring that the purpose of the artificial in-
semination was to provide a child "for the mutual happiness of the parties"). In Gur-
sky, the court also found that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the
wife would have gone through with the procedure without her husband's consent.
See id. at 411-12. In all three of the above-cited cases, the husband was ordered to
pay child support. See Levin 645 N.E.2d at 605; Marriage of Adams, 528 N.E.2d at
1087; Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
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statute to gestational surrogacy, then it naturally follows that
the concept of equitable estoppel should be applicable as well."
The court instead based its decision primarily on Johnson v.
Calvert7 and the "intent to procreate" standard." In Johnson,
the surrogate mother breached the surrogacy contract by refus-
ing to turn the baby over to the Calverts after he had been
born.89 Unlike the Buzzanca facts, in Johnson the embryo was
created by the sperm and egg of the Calverts, and thus both the
genetic mother and the gestational mother had a legal claim to
the child under California law.' Arguably, the "intent to procre-
ate" standard should be applied when a state, like California,
has no legislation governing this specific area.
III. THE "INTENT TO PROCREATE" STANDARD SHOULD GOVERN
THESE CASES ABSENT STATE LEGISLATION
The "intent to procreate" standard has been articulated in
literary and legal writings about surrogacy,1 and was used to de-
termine legal parentage in Johnson v. Calvert,' upon which the
See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 287 (Ct. App. 1998) (de-
claring, "[iut must also be noted that in applying the artificial insemination statute
to a case where a party has caused a child to be brought into the world, the statu-
tory policy is really echoing a more fundamental idea.... [TIhat idea is often
summed up in the legal term 'estoppel.' ").
87 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
N See Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288 (stating, "[tihere is no need
in the present case to predicate our decision on common law estoppel alone, though
the doctrine certainly applies").
9 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. The surrogate mother notified the genetic par-
ents that she would refuse to give up the child unless she received the payments due
to her. The couple and the surrogate mother then each sought a declaration from
the courts as to who the legal parents were. See id.
g See id. at 778-79. California has adopted the Uniform Parentage Act, which
allows maternity to be established by the existence of a genetic link, or from proof
that the woman gave birth to the child. See DEERING'S ANN. FAM. CODE §§ 7610 &
7650 (Cal.) (Bancroft Whitney 1996 & 1999 Supp.).
9' See, e.g., DOLGIN, supra note 1; Hill, supra note 46, at 357-58 (advocating an
"intent to procreate" standard); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology
and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 297 (1990).
'* 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). The court stated:
We conclude that although the [Uniform Parentage] Act recognizes both
genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother
and child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman,
she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring
about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is the
natural mother under California law.
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appellate court in Buzzanca relied.' The concept of "intent to
procreate" is akin to "intent" in a contractual sense. Courts us-
ing this test, however, have not decided these disputes using the
law of contracts as a guide. Rather, they have attempted to
mesh contractual intent basis with traditional methods of family
law.9' They argue that while traditional methods of conception
can occur without planning and often without a desire to con-
ceive a child, procreation using assisted reproductive technolo-
gies requires planning and the desire to have a baby.95 Thus,
there is a manifest intent to create a child.
This intent becomes apparent when one examines the proc-
ess of creating a child through a surrogacy arrangement." First,
the would-be parents must decide they want to have a child.
Second, they must determine what method of surrogacy will best
suit them. Finally, they must find the appropriate surrogate and
then, in the case of gestational surrogacy, they must wait to
learn if a child has actually been conceived.' Moreover, the
sheer expense of these surrogacy arrangements implies that very
careful deliberation went into the decision to have a child. 98 A
Id. at 782.
See Jaycee B. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 702 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Johnson, 851 P.2d at 776.
94 See DOLGIN, supra note 1, at 182 (asserting that "[i]f the law were clearly to
define intent in such cases to reflect principles of contract, the concept would lose its
usefulness in mediating conflicting understandings of family"). Opponents of the in-
tent based standard for determining parentage argue that it bases familial relation-
ships solely on contractual arrangements which is contradictory to traditional no-
tions of family values. See id. at 213.
95 See Shultz, supra note 91, at 324 (proposing that people using assisted meth-
ods of reproduction necessarily plan and deliberate more, in most cases, than cou-
ples who use ordinary methods of reproduction). Professor Shultz argues that ab-
sent legislation surrounding assisted methods of reproduction, an intent based
standard should be used to determine legal parentage. See id. at 323.
96While the same deliberative process logically applies to any assisted method
of reproduction, for purposes of this Comment only references to surrogacy con-
tracts will be made.
" Recall that in gestational surrogacy, the embryo is implanted in the surrogate
using IVF. See supra note 5. In IVF, after the embryo is transferred to the uterine
cavity, it must attach in the uterus in order for gestation to begin. There is always
the chance that the embryo will not attach and the process must be done again. See
also OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 123, 130-31 (discussing in vitro fertilization and
some of the risks involved).
"See In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128, 1143 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (stat-
ing that the surrogate was paid $10,000 over and above all her necessary medical
expenses incurred during her pregnancy), rev'd, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); see also
OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 275-76 (giving detailed description of necessary ex-
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couple without the financial security to both go through with the
agreement, and adequately support the child upon birth, would
be unlikely to enter into this type of arrangement. Conversely,
in an unplanned pregnancy, parents do not have the same oppor-
tunity to consider all aspects of having and raising a baby, ab-
sent considering abortion or putting the child up for adoption.
The second argument in favor of the intent based standard
is that an individual responsible for a child's birth should not be
permitted to escape parental obligations. The child would not
have been born absent the intended parents' motivation to have
a child and their consent to the medical procedure of implanta-
tion." Therefore, a parent should not be able to evade their obli-
penses involved in entering into and performing a surrogacy contract); DOLGIN, su-
pra note 1, at 65 (stating that most surrogates in commercial surrogacy arrange-
ments receive anywhere from $10,000 to $15,000); Hill, supra note 46, at 358-59
(using a hypothetical surrogacy arrangement and stating that the surrogate is to be
paid $10,000).
99 See Hill, supra note 46, at 415 (arguing that the intended parents are "the
first cause, or the prime movers, of the procreative relationship" and should there-
fore be given legal parent status). Professor Hill refers to this as the " 'But-For' Cau-
sation Argument" and argues that while any gestational host or gamete provider
will suffice to produce a child, only the intended parents "stand[] in the relationship
with the child [as] the but for cause of the child's existence." Id. at 414-15; see also
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that when two women can
claim legal parentage to a child born of a gestational surrogacy contract, "she who
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is
the natural mother under California law"); McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d
477, 480 (2d Dep't 1994) (following Johnson v. Calvert and holding that the gesta-
tional mother was the legal mother in a custody dispute over children born through
in vitro fertilization of wife with donor's egg and husband's sperm); In re Baby Doe,
353 S.E.2d 877, 878 (S.C. 1987) (holding that husband who consented to his wife's
insemination with donor sperm could be deemed the child's legal father and become
obligated to support the child because he consented to the insemination with the
intent that the child be raised as his own); People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 499-
500 (Cal. 1968) (declaring that husband who consents to artificial insemination of
his wife with sperm from a third party donor is the child's legal father). The
Sorenson court appropriately stated, "[o]ne who consents to the production of a child
cannot create a temporary relation to be assumed and disclaimed at will, but the
arrangement must be of such character as to impose an obligation of supporting
those for whose existence he is directly responsible." Id. at 499.
The dissenting judge in Johnson v. Calvert criticized the majority's reliance on
the but-for test in preferring the biological mother over the gestational mother as
the legal parent. She argued that but-for causation is a tort principle and should not
be applied in the family law setting. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 796 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting). She also advocated that while the California test for causation is "whether
the conduct was a 'substantial factor' in bringing about the event," that test clearly
shows that both the gestational mother and the biological mother are equally sub-
stantial factors in bringing about the child's birth. She concluded that the majority
was "misplaced" in using the intent standard to prefer the biological mother over
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gations because the statutes and case law do not yet fully pro-
vide for all types of surrogacy arrangements. Similarly, the in-
tent based standard creates predictability and stability for the
parties involved, especially for the child. 1'0 If it is determined at
the outset of the agreement that the intended parents will be the
child's legal parents, and the surrogate agrees to perform the
contract, then she will do so with full knowledge that she will
have no parental rights to the child. Additionally, by agreeing to
the arrangement, the intended parents will have a full under-
standing that they will be solely responsible for the child's wel-
fare. Further, should a dispute be subject to a lengthy litigation
process, the child will know exactly who his or her parents are,
and will never face the possibility of being removed from his or
her present home, and having to get to know a "new" mother or
father.101
Although the Buzzanca situation was not at issue before the
Johnson court, the court recognized the possibility of such a
situation. Finding the dicta in Johnson determinative, the ap-
pellate court reiterated, "a rule recognizing the intending par-
ents as the child's legal, natural parents should best promote
certainty and stability."' °2 The dissenting justice in Johnson,
however, advocated the use of a different test-the "best inter-
ests of the child" standard. Justice Kennard argued that the
child's welfare is of paramount importance, which the best inter-
ests standard respects, whereas the intent to procreate standard
subordinates the child's interest to those of the underlying con-
the gestational mother. Id. at 795-96. Justice Kennard would have applied the "best
interests of the child" standard to determine legal parentage, but did not opine on
whether the outcome would have been different. Id. at 799.
100 See Hill, supra note 46, at 417 (stating that all the parties to a surrogacy
contract are adversely affected when the identity of the parents is not determined at
the outset). Professor Hill argues that the gestational host will be less likely to
breach the agreement and attempt to keep the child. He asserts that if the surro-
gate knows at the time of conception she will not have any rights to the child, she
will be less likely to develop attachments to the child with the prospect of raising
him or her. See id. He also claims that the intended parents become better emotion-
ally and financially prepared for the child's birth if they are assured that they can-
not lose their child to the surrogate if she attempts to breach the contract. See id.
'' See id. at 417 (declaring that when the identity of the parents is unclear and
litigation ensues, the child may be uncertain as to who his or her parents are, and
may be subjected to shared custody between the surrogate and the intended parents
if the4judge determines that the surrogate has a parental claim).
10 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 290 (Ct. App. 1998) (quot-
ing Johnson, 851 P.2d at 776).
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tractual issues."° It is beyond dispute that Jaycee's welfare was
the primary concern in deciding the Buzzanca case. As the ma-
jority stated, however, the intent to procreate standard in surro-
gacy disputes arguably will almost always coincide with the
child's best interests.'" In this case, by declaring John and
Luanne Buzzanca her legal parents, Jaycee was able to maintain
and further develop a stable relationship with Luanne, who had
provided a home for her since birth. Additionally, she has re-
ceived support from two parents as opposed to one. These two
factors are certainly in Jaycee's best interests, and are also a re-
flection of John and Luanne's intent at the inception of the sur-
rogacy arrangements."°  Further, the surrogate's expectations
were upheld because she was not burdened with a responsibility
she had not contemplated."°
Arguably, the intent to procreate standard is more favorable
than the best interest standard because, for the latter standard
to be applied, the parties must already be in litigation. If paren-
tal status is determined at the outset of the contract, the parties
will know exactly what their rights and responsibilities are and
will enter into the contract with this in mind. Further, the child
is less likely to be disrupted when his or her parent-child rela-
tionship is decided upon conception, as opposed to the situation
here, where the relationship was finally determined three years
after her birth.'07
The available case law on surrogacy appears to have as
many variations as do the state legislatures. Until each type of
103 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 799 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (declaring that "[this
'best interests' standard serves to assure that in the judicial resolution of disputes
affecting a child's well-being, protection of the minor child is the foremost considera-
tion"). Justice Kennard also acknowledged that in child welfare issues the courts
customarily use the best interests test and argued that "this court should not look
to... contract law, but to family law, as the governing paradigm and source of a
rule of decision." Id.
1 4 See id. at 783. The court stated:
[Tihe interests of the children, particularly at the outset of their lives, are
"[un]likely to run contrary to those of adults who choose to bring them into
being." Thus, "[hionoring the plans and expectations of adults who will be
responsible for a child's welfare is likely to correlate significantly with posi-
tive outcomes for parents and children alike."
Id. (citations omitted).
'05 See Jaycee B. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 697 (Ct. App. 1996).
100 See id. at 701.
107 Jaycee Buzzanca was born on April 26, 1995. See id. at 697. It could not be
said who her "real parents" were until March 10, 1998.
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surrogacy arrangement makes its way through the court system,
it is possible for a "parent" to deny his or her obligations and re-
sponsibilities through gaps in the existing law. To avoid this
problem and the potential damage to the children who become
exposed to such litigation, it is imperative that uniform legisla-
tion be enacted."u
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
In 1988, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws approved the Uniform Status of Children of As-
sisted Conception Act ("the Act").' °9 The purpose of the Act was
"to provide order and design that would inure to the benefit of
those children who have been born as a result of this new mod-
ern miracle," focusing on the rights of the children as opposed to
their parents."0 It was specifically "not [meant] to be a regula-
tory act.""' The Act provides for two alternatives to assisted
conception methods. Alternative B renders all surrogacy con-
tracts void; a child born pursuant to a void contract is the child
of the surrogate."12  Alternative A provides for surrogacy ar-
rangements and requires that the intended couple and the sur-
rogate receive prior court approval to enter into a surrogacy con-
tract."' Should parties enter into a surrogacy arrangement that
has not received prior court approval, the agreement is void and
the surrogate is the legal mother of the resulting child."' Once
the parties obtain court approval, the intended parents become
the legal parents of the child upon birth, and the surrogate
waives any parental rights."' The requirements that must be
108 See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998) (stating that, "[wihat is
plain, however, is the need for clear, consistent principles to guide parties in pro-
tecting their interests and resolving their disputes, and the need for particular care
in fashioning such principles as issues are better defined and appreciated").
109 UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B U.L.A- 184
(Supp. 1998) [hereinafter "ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT"].
1 Id. at 185.
Id.
112 See id. at 197 (describing surrogate agreements as void).
"a See id. at 190-97. The only state that has substantially adopted this provi-
sion is Virginia. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-165 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).
14 See ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, supra note 109, at 191 (Section 5(b) provides
that [i]f the agreement is not approved by the court under Section 6 before concep-
tion, the agreement is void and the surrogate is the mother of a resulting child and
the surrogate's husband, if a party to the agreement, is the father of the child").
15 See id. § 5(a). Under this alternative, any party to the contract has the right
to terminate the contract before the surrogate becomes pregnant so long as they
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met by all parties to the contract, in order to receive court ap-
proval, are extensive. The Commissioners, however, believed
they were necessary in order to ensure the welfare of any child
born pursuant to a surrogacy contract."6 Some of the require-
ments include: (1) the inability of the intended mother to bear a
child; (2) the great risk or injury or death to either the mother or
the child during the pregnancy or childbirth; (3) a home study by
a child-welfare agency of the intended parents and the surrogate;
(4) required fitness standards, like those of potential adoptive
parents within a state, which the surrogate and the intended
parents must meet; (5) at least one successful prior pregnancy of
the surrogate and an assessment that to have another would not
pose a risk to either the child or the surrogate; and (6) manda-
tory counseling for all parties related to the contract." 7 The Act
also provides for payment to the surrogate for her services.1
8
Although it would appear that this model legislation would
be the solution to the legal deficiency surrounding surrogacy is-
sues, the Act has one major weakness: it does not specifically
cover the Jaycee situation. Section I of the Act defines intended
parents as "a man and woman, married to each other, who enter
into an agreement under this [Act] providing that they will be
the parents of a child born to a surrogate through assisted con-
ception using egg or sperm of one or both of the intended par-
ents.""'9 The Act does not contemplate that the egg and sperm
could be donated by anonymous, non-contracting parties, with
the resulting embryo having no genetic relationship to either in-
tended parent. To broaden the Act and to provide fully for all
"children who have been born as a result of this new modern
provide written notice to the court. If the surrogate has also provided the egg, she
has the right to terminate the contract without any liability to the intended parents
within 180 days after the last insemination. See id. § 7 at 194.
"0 See id. at 186. The Prefatory Note includes the following statement:
The process may in some instances seem to burden the court, and the in-
tended parents must enter these arrangements fully prepared for certain
exigencies and risk, but to assure the desired result there must be some
burden, some inconvenience and even some risk when the life and well be-
ing of a child is in the balance.
Id.
117 See id. § 6(b) at 192 (listing the requirements to approve the surrogacy
agreement and declare the intended parents to be the parents of the child).
8 See id. § 9(a) at 196 (stating that a surrogacy agreement under section 6 may
provide for the payment of consideration).
.. Id. § 1(3) at 187 (emphasis added).
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miracle,"12 the intended parents must also be the legal parents
when both the egg and sperm donors are anonymous.12'
CONCLUSION
In re Marriage of Buzzanca is the prime example of the in-
adequacy of the current legal state of surrogacy contracts. Al-
though the people who brought about Jaycee's existence were
fully capable of providing for her, and Luanne Buzzanca truly
wanted to be Jaycee's mother, Jaycee was a legal orphan until
the age of three. The California Supreme Court has declined to
hear this case from a subsequent appeal."l Although the inter-
mediate court has come up with the best decision under these
circumstances, the law unfortunately remains deficient and un-
settled. As expressed in the beginning of this paper, the legal
fate of children born pursuant to surrogacy arrangements can no
longer be avoided. Assisted reproductive methods and surrogacy
contracts can enable couples who were at one time destined to
remain childless to enrich their lives through the birth of a child.
Paradoxically, absent fully encompassing legislation, and with a
body of case law that leaves gaps with respect to key issues, the
very methods that can create a family can also destroy it.
Laura A. Brill
120 Id. at 185.
121 See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998) (providing that the
intended parents are the legal parents of a child born pursuant to a surrogacy con-
tract regardless of the genetic relationship, or lack thereof, between the intended
parents, the child, and the surrogate). This is the definition that should be added to.
the ULA definition to fully encompass all possible surrogacy arrangements.
122 See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 3830 (June 10, 1998).
